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Cost-Effectiveness of Targeted Reemployment Bonuses 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 Targeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified 
as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments.  We show that targeting 
bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services systems can improve cost effectiveness.  Since estimated average benefit payments do not 
steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened, we find that narrow targeting is not 
optimal.  The best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the 
half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.   
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I. Introduction 
 Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment bonus experiments were conducted on 
unemployment insurance (UI) recipients in Illinois, New Jersey, Washington, and Pennsylvania.  
These experiments offered lump sum payments to UI recipients who began new jobs within a 
prescribed period and remained employed for at least four months.  The bonuses were designed 
to speed reemployment of UI recipients and thereby reduce UI benefit payments.  Findings from 
the four experiments demonstrated that, as expected, the reemployment bonuses reduced UI 
payments.  However, the reductions in payments were usually not large enough to fully cover the 
costs of paying and administering the bonuses (Decker and O’Leary 1995).  The bonuses, 
therefore, were not cost- effective from the perspective of the UI system. 
 In 1993, the federal government passed laws requiring states to establish Worker 
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems to target reemployment services to UI 
recipients expected to face long unemployment spells.1  The passage of the WPRS legislation 
was based largely on evidence that providing targeted UI recipients with reemployment services 
reduced UI payments enough to pay for the costs of providing the services (Corson et al. 1989; 
Meyer 1995).  Federal legislation proposed in 1994 would have permitted states to offer a 
targeted reemployment bonus, but the proposal was not enacted. Currently, reemployment 
bonuses are not among the reemployment services that states may offer.  In 2003, however, the 
Bush administration proposed a targeted reemployment bonus as a feature of new personal 
reemployment accounts.     
                                                          
1This targeting approach is also used as part of the Self Employment Assistance program which was 
enacted in late 1993 as a UI program option for states. 
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 While the experiments demonstrated that a non-targeted bonus is not cost-effective, 
targeting reemployment bonuses to a segment of the UI recipient population using the WPRS 
approach might yield different findings.  This would depend on the extent to which those 
targeted for the bonus offer respond to the offer, and whether those responding would have had 
relatively long UI spells in the absence of the offer.  This paper examines that question using 
data from the two most policy-relevant experiments—those in Pennsylvania and Washington.  
We calculate bonus effects for subgroups of recipients defined according to their predicted 
probability of exhausting UI benefits.  We then investigate whether the bonus effects on UI 
receipt are larger for recipients with higher predicted probabilities of exhaustion.  We also 
examine whether the net benefits of a bonus offer are likely to vary according to the predicted 
probability of exhaustion, and if so, whether one can use the probabilities to target the bonus 
offer so as to make it cost effective.  While small sample sizes preclude strong conclusions, the 
initial results presented here suggest a potential role for targeting in making reemployment 
bonuses cost-effective and a useful policy tool.   
 
II. The Reemployment Bonus Experiments and Eligibility Screening 
 The first bonus experiment conducted in Illinois during 1984–85 estimated a 1.15 week 
reduction in the average duration of UI compensated unemployment in response to a $500 bonus 
offer for reemployment within 11 weeks (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).  Subsequent 
experiments, attempting to validate the impressive Illinois findings, yielded more modest effect 
estimates.  A 1985–86 experiment in New Jersey involving a bonus offer that declined with the 
duration of unemployment and reached zero after 12 weeks generated a more modest reduction 
in UI duration (Corson et al. 1989).  To identify the ideal bonus amount and offer duration, two 
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additional experiments involving 11 different treatments were conducted in 1988–89, in 
Pennsylvania (Corson et al. 1992) and Washington (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995). 
 The bonus experiments had relatively few eligibility requirements for UI recipients to be 
included in the treatment or control groups.  In the Washington experiment, the only condition 
was to meet the standard state UI eligibility requirement on prior earnings. To ensure that 
bonuses were directed to permanently separated employees, the Illinois and Pennsylvania 
experiments had additional requirements that recipients not have a specific date for recall to their 
prior job, and that they not be affiliated with a union hiring hall.  The New Jersey experiment had 
all these conditions and also required that recipients be at least 25 years of age with at least three 
years on the prior job.  The New Jersey requirements focused the experiment on recipients who 
were likely to be permanently displaced from a long-term job.      
 The eligibility conditions in these experiments were as inclusive as possible because there 
was no consensus on what screens might be adopted for an ongoing program.  The inclusive 
sample design provided for ex post evaluation of eligibility restrictions.  In this paper, we 
accomplish this by simulating the effects of different targeting rules defined according to an 
estimated probability of UI benefit exhaustion. 
 
III. Worker Profiling and Reemployment Bonus Effects 
 All states are now using WPRS systems to target reemployment services (Wandner 
1997).  Worker profiling is a two-step process:  In the first step, permanently separated workers 
are identified by screening out those expecting recall to their previous employer and those 
subject to an exclusive union hiring hall agreement.  The second step is to determine which of 
these permanently separated workers are expected to be long-term benefit recipients.  In most 
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states, this step involves predicting a recipient’s probability of exhausting UI benefits using a 
logit model estimated on historical state data (Olsen et al. 2002).  The dependent variable in 
these logit models is usually a binary outcome—whether or not the full UI benefit entitlement is 
exhausted.  The independent variables in the model commonly include educational attainment, 
job tenure, employment growth in the previous industry and occupation, and the local 
unemployment rate.  Variables for age, gender, and race are prohibited by civil rights 
considerations.  When a worker opens a new claim for UI benefits, their personal and labor 
market characteristics are entered into a profiling equation to predict their probability of benefit 
exhaustion.   
 Using data from the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, we simulate the effects 
of using a two-step profiling model to target bonus offers to claimants with a high expected 
probability of benefit exhaustion.  For both experiments, we start with the full comparison group 
samples.  In the first step, we exclude all union hiring hall members and those awaiting recall to 
their prior job.  In the second step, we estimate a statistical model of the probability of benefit 
exhaustion for each state.  We specify statistical models that are approximately equivalent to the 
existing state WPRS models.  Both models include explanatory variables to control for each 
claimant’s educational attainment, job tenure, industry, and local unemployment rates.  The 
Washington model also controls for each claimant’s previous occupation.2 
 Based on the ordering of predicted probabilities of UI benefit exhaustion, Figure 1 shows 
the mean predicted probability of exhaustion for decile groups of the comparison samples 
contrasted to the actual proportion exhausting benefits in that group.  The actual exhaustion rates 
                                                          
2Details of the profiling models used are given in O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1998). 
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tend to be higher for decile groups with higher predicted exhaustion rates.3  For example, in 
Washington the actual exhaustion rate is 45 percent for the top decile group, compared with 11 
percent for the bottom decile group.  These findings also demonstrate that the predictive power 
of the model—even when used to predict within sample—is somewhat modest.4  That is, the 
model is unable to isolate groups of claimants who have either extremely high or low exhaustion 
probabilities.  Prediction performance of the models is constrained, in part, by exclusion of the 
prohibited variables on age, gender, and race.  Despite the limitations of the models, these are 
representative of what states have to work with in their actual WPRS programs.  
 Once the benefit exhaustion model has been estimated, the next step in developing rules 
for targeting bonus offers to claimants is to set an exhaustion probability to serve as the threshold 
for offering a bonus.  To examine the effects of various targeting rules, we order predicted 
exhaustion probabilities from lowest to highest and compute treatment effects for marginal and 
cumulative decile groups in the distribution.   
 Estimates of the effect of the mean bonus offer on UI receipt are presented in Table 1 for 
differing bonus offer targeting thresholds defined at deciles of the distribution of the predicted UI 
exhaustion probability.5  The first row of the table reports that the estimated mean effect of 
bonus offers made to the top 10 percent of the distribution of predicted UI exhaustion probability 
                                                          
3Because the results presented in Figure 1 were calculated using the same sample that was used to estimate 
the profiling model, these findings do not provide a truly fair tests of the predictive power of the profiling model.  
The findings presented later in the paper may therefore depend on having somewhat greater predictive power than 
would be available to a state that uses a similar regression model.  On the other hand, states that develop more 
refined models of UI exhaustion may have comparable or even superior ability to predict exhaustion rates. 
4Model performance can also be judged by contrasting the predicted probability of exhaustion between 
those who actually exhaust UI benefits and those who do not.  For the control group, the mean predicted probability 
among those who actually exhausted benefits was 1.6 percentage points higher in Pennsylvania and 2.0 percentage 
points higher in Washington than those who did not exhaust. 
5The mean response reported in Table 1 is computed across five treatments for Pennsylvania and six 
treatments for Washington. 
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in Pennsylvania is to reduce UI payments by $231, but to increase them by $56 in Washington.  
Lowering the offer threshold by ten percentage points of the distribution, the marginal effects for 
the 9th decile group are -$265 in Pennsylvania and -$117 in Washington with the cumulative 
effects for the top twenty percent of the sample being -$251 in Pennsylvania and -$40 in 
Washington.  The rows of Table 1 present estimates of bonus offer effects as the bonus offer 
threshold is gradually lowered in ten percentage point steps of the predicted UI benefit 
exhaustion distribution. Estimates are given both for the marginal and cumulative groups in the 
distribution.  Estimates are computed by contrasting benefit receipt of treatment group members 
with control group members in the same range of predicted probability of UI benefit exhaustion.   
 The estimates in Table 1 do not provide clear guidance for selecting the probability 
threshold that would maximize estimated bonus effects.  For the Pennsylvania experiment, the 
10th, 9th, 7th, and 5th decile groups have the largest estimated effects.  For the Washington 
experiment, the 9th and 5th decile groups have the greatest estimated effects.   
 These findings suggest that although the bonus offers may have larger effects on UI 
receipt for groups with higher predicted probabilities of benefit exhaustion, that is not necessarily 
the case.  So that narrowly targeting bonus offers to those most likely to exhaust—such as those 
only in the top decile group—may not maximize the overall response.  Given that targeting only 
the top of the distribution does not appear to be effective, we instead focus the rest of our 
analysis on the effects of targeting the bonus offer using two thresholds further down in the 
distribution—the 75th percentile and the 50th percentile.  
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IV. Net Benefits of Targeted Bonus Offers 
 To examine the net benefits of targeted bonus offers, Table 2 presents estimates of all the 
elements required for computations: UI effects, bonus costs, and earnings effects.  These 
estimates are presented for the top 25 percent and top 50 percent predicted as most likely to 
exhaust UI and for the full samples for each experiment.  For additional insight, estimates are 
presented for both the mean of all bonus offers tested in each state as well as for the offer that 
generated the best net benefit results in both states: the low bonus amount/long qualification 
offer (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998).   
We take the perspective of the UI system to evaluate the effect of targeting on the 
estimated net benefits of the bonus offers.  The UI system benefits from a bonus offer to the 
degree that UI payments decline and UI tax revenues rise from increased earnings.  At the same 
time, the UI system incurs the costs of paying and administering the bonuses.   
For the combined bonus treatments, the estimated UI effects tend to be greater for the 
targeted recipients than for the full sample.  For example, in Pennsylvania the estimated 
reductions in UI receipt are $139 for the top 25 percent of recipients and $158 for the top 50 
percent of recipients, compared with $113 for the full sample.  In Washington, the estimated 
reductions in UI receipt are $30 for the top 25 percent and $53 for the top 50 percent, compared 
with $30 for the full sample. Neither experiment provides any evidence that bonus effects on UI 
receipt are larger when narrowly targeted to the top 25 percent of recipients compared to 
targeting the top 50 percent.   
 Estimated effects on earnings in the year after an initial UI claim show a consistent 
pattern: effects are larger for the targeted groups than for the full sample.  For example, in 
Pennsylvania the estimated bonus effects on average earnings are $536 and $616 for the top 25 
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and 50 percent of recipients respectively, compared with $318 for the full sample.  A similar 
pattern exists for the Washington effects on earnings—estimated effects for the targeted 
recipients are higher than for the full sample—although all of the Washington estimates are 
negative.   
Just as the UI benefit savings from the bonus offers tend to be greater when targeted to 
recipients with higher exhaustion probabilities, it also appears that the bonus costs are greater for 
the targeted groups.  In both Pennsylvania and Washington, bonus payment costs are slightly 
higher for the top 25 and 50 percent of recipients than for the full sample.  The differences are 
modest in Pennsylvania, where the average bonus costs are $105 and $104 for the top 25 and top 
50 percent of recipients, compared with $95 for the full sample.  The differences are similarly 
small in Washington: $110 and $119 for the top 25 and top 50 percent, compared with $105 for 
the full sample.  
Estimated net benefits to the UI system are computed as the dollar value of savings 
measured by UI effects, plus UI tax contributions on additional earnings, minus the sum of bonus 
payment and program administration costs.  The current average UI tax contribution rates on 
earnings are 1.00 percent in Pennsylvania and 1.15 percent in Washington.  Program 
administration cost was estimated to be $33 per offer in Pennsylvania and $3 in Washington 
(Corson et al. 1992; O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995).  Because of restricted sample sizes, 
the net benefit estimates presented in Table 2 are imprecisely estimated.  Nonetheless, the pattern 
of point estimates is informative.   
 Targeting offers improves the estimated net benefits of the mean bonus offers.  In both 
experiments, the net benefits per recipient are negative when estimated for the full sample:  -$12 
per recipient in Pennsylvania and -$86 per recipient in Washington.  In Pennsylvania, targeting 
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improves net benefits per recipient to $6 for the top 25 percent of recipients, and to $27 for the 
top 50 percent.  In Washington, targeting the offers failed to generate positive net benefits, but 
estimated net costs are lower when targeting to the top 50 percent.  Since the estimated net 
benefits are no greater for the top 25 percent than for the top 50 percent, they provide no 
indication that more exclusive targeting on the highest probabilities of exhaustion is a better 
strategy.  
Compared to the mean bonus offer, the low bonus/long qualification offer in both 
experiments generated larger reductions in UI benefit payments, bigger earnings gains, and had 
lower bonus payment costs.  The low bonus amount/long qualification period treatment in 
Pennsylvania offered a bonus equal to three times the weekly benefit amount (WBA) for 
reemployment within 12 weeks.  This treatment was estimated to generate positive mean net 
benefits of $26 per offer, with estimated net benefits of $72 and $88 per offer respectively when 
targeting the top 25 percent and top 50 percent of the distribution of predicted exhaustion 
probabilities.  In Washington the similar treatment offered a bonus of two times the WBA for 
reemployment within about 13 weeks.  Point estimates of net benefits reported in Table 2 are 
positive for the full and targeted samples with an estimated net benefit of $46 when targeted to 
the top half of the predicted UI exhaustion probability distribution in Washington.   
 Among the 11 different bonus designs evaluated in Pennsylvania and Washington, the 
most cost-effective treatment design and targeting plan to emerge combines a low bonus amount 
with a long qualification period, targeted to the 50 percent most likely to exhaust UI benefits.6   
                                                          
6 O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1998) provide complete details for computing net benefit estimates for 
all 11 reemployment bonus treatments tested in Pennsylvania and Washington, including estimates of effects on UI 
benefits, bonus payments, and earnings. 
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For example, a bonus amount set at three times the WBA, with a qualification period 12 weeks 
long, and targeted to the half of claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement 
would be a good design.  As summarized in Table 2, such a bonus offer should promote quicker 
return to work and on average generate net savings to the UI trust fund.  
 
V. Caveats 
Targeting with profiling models improves the appeal of the reemployment bonus program 
for employment policy.  However, two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost-
effectiveness for an operational program (Meyer 1995):  First, an actual bonus program could 
have a displacement effect.  Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are offered a bonus 
increase their rate of reemployment at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus.  
Second, there is also the risk that an operational bonus offer program could induce an entry 
effect.  That is, the availability of a reemployment bonus might result in a larger proportion of 
unemployed job seekers entering the UI system.   
 If entry and displacement effects are sizeable, actual program cost-effectiveness will be 
lowered.  However, targeting low bonus amount—long qualification period offers to only those 
most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks.  Targeting would introduce uncertainty 
that a bonus offer would be forthcoming upon filing a UI claim, which should reduce the chance 
of a large entry effect.  Also, targeting should reduce any potential for displacement, since a 
smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus offer.7  
                                                          
7Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that a non-targeted bonus offer to all UI claimants could increase 
unemployment durations among those not eligible for UI by between 0.2 and 0.4 weeks.   
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VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
 Unemployment insurance (UI) provides labor force members with partial wage 
replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment.  In performing this income 
maintenance function, the system potentially prolongs unemployment spells (Decker 1997).  To 
reduce avoidable joblessness, most states require active job search by UI beneficiaries.  In terms 
of carrot and stick incentives, such work search rules represent the stick.  
 In the 1980s, reemployment bonuses were tested as positive reemployment incentives by 
field experiments in the federal-state UI system.  Reemployment bonuses were intended to speed 
return to work in a manner that would benefit employees, employers, and the government.  
Claimants were still provided the income security of UI, but if they returned to work sooner, 
system costs may have been lower.  The original findings from the experiments did not generate 
overwhelming support for reemployment bonuses.  We have reexamined the evidence to 
evaluate whether bonuses targeted to those most likely to exhaust UI benefits would be cost-
effective.   
 Profiling models similar to those used by states as part of their Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems were used to identify UI claimants most likely to 
exhaust their benefits.  Using such models to target reemployment bonus offers to those 
claimants most likely to exhaust UI can increase the cost-effectiveness of bonus offers by 
generating larger average reductions in UI benefit payments than non-targeted bonus offers.  
However, estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is 
gradually tightened.   
 For several bonus designs, offers made to the top half of the distribution of claimants 
most likely to exhaust resulted in bigger benefit payment reductions than offers made to the top 
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quarter of the distribution.  While targeting may reduce benefit payments, however, it does not 
guarantee that bonus offers will yield positive net benefits.  The average size of bonus payments 
is also significant.  
 The single treatment design that emerged as the best candidate for a targeted 
reemployment bonus is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period and a four-month 
reemployment requirement, targeted to the half of claimants most likely to exhaust their UI 
benefit entitlement.  Our estimates suggest that such a targeted bonus offer would yield 
appreciable net benefits to the UI trust funds if implemented as a permanent program.  
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Table 1. Effects of Combined Treatments on UI Benefit Dollars Paid Per Claimant for Decile 
Groups of the Predicted Probability of UI Benefit Exhaustion (Standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 Pennsylvania  Washington 
Exhaustion probability  
decile group  Marginal Cumulative  Marginal Cumulative 
10th   -231 
(216) 
-231 
(216) 
 56 
(137) 
56 
(137) 
9th   -265 
(220) 
-251 
(154) 
 -117 
(148) 
-40 
(101) 
8th   -103 
(205) 
-199 
(124) 
 -194 
(156) 
-89 
(85) 
7th   -175 
(219) 
-201* 
(108) 
 -24 
(148) 
-72 
(74) 
6th   11 
(193) 
-158* 
(95) 
 29 
(146) 
-53 
(66) 
5th   -258 
(192) 
-171** 
(85) 
 -216 
(138) 
-82 
(60) 
4th   165 
(186) 
-119 
(78) 
 12 
(129) 
-72 
(55) 
3rd   12 
(187) 
-99 
(72) 
 136 
(122) 
-45 
(50) 
2nd   -225 
(184) 
-112* 
(67) 
 -50 
(115) 
-40 
(47) 
1st   -121 
(186) 
-113* 
(63) 
 50 
(104) 
-30 
(44) 
 
Sample size 
  
5,199 
 
5,199 
  
12,144 
 
12,144 
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test. 
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.   
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Table 2.  Estimated UI Effects, Earnings Effects, Bonus Payment Costs, and Net Benefits to the 
UI System per Claimant for Alternative UI Benefit Exhaustion Probability Groups 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Mean bonus offer  Low bonus/Long qualification offer
  Top 25 
percent 
Top 50 
percent 
Full 
sample 
 Top 25 
percent 
Top 50 
percent 
Full  
Sample 
PENNSYLVANIA 
UI effects   -139 
(136) 
-158* 
(95) 
-113* 
(63) 
 -175 
(200) 
-183 
(135) 
-114 
(91) 
Earnings effects  536 
(568) 
616 
(418) 
318 
(275) 
 810 
(810) 
822 
(584) 
363 
(391) 
Bonus payment 
   costs 
 105 
(11) 
104 
(8) 
95 
(5) 
 78 
(16) 
70 
(10) 
59 
(7) 
Net benefits 
   to the UI system 
 6 
(137) 
27 
(95) 
-12 
(63) 
 72 
(201) 
88 
(135) 
26 
(91) 
WASHINGTON 
UI effects  -30 
(92) 
-53 
(66) 
-30 
(44) 
 -75 
(124) 
-106 
(90) 
-74 
(59) 
Earnings effects  -412 
(1509) 
-106 
(849) 
-722 
(526) 
 -260 
(2287) 
649 
(1399) 
119 
(897) 
Bonus payment 
   costs 
 110 
(6) 
119 
(4) 
105 
(3) 
 62 
(6) 
64 
(5) 
52 
(3) 
Net benefits 
   to the UI system 
 -88 
(94) 
-70 
(67) 
-86* 
(45) 
 7 
(127) 
46 
(92) 
20 
(60) 
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test. 
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test. 
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Figure 1. Predicted and Actual UI Exhaustion Rates 
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